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States that choose to involve themselves in an ongoing dispute do so by
choosing to align with or against one of the original disputants. What
factors lead states to prefer to help one side over the other? We consider
the effect of the disputants’ power, political and economic institutional
similarities between each disputant and the aligning state, and formal
alliance commitments between each disputant and the aligning state on
these alignment choices. We evaluate these expectations empirically by
examining the alignment choices of states that joined with one side or
another in a Militarized Interstate Dispute during the period of 1816 to
1986. The results indicate that regardless of regime type, institutional
similarities matter to the aligning state’s decision. We also find that power
concerns matter only to autocracies; democracies do not seem to base their
alignment choices on the power of the sides in the dispute. Finally, the
evidence indicates that the alignment choices of democracies cannot be
anticipated by their prior alliance commitments, although the alignment
choices of autocracies can. These results suggest interesting implications for
research on the democratic peace, the determinants of threat in the interna-
tional system, and the impact of selection effects. The consistent empirical
evidence that institutional similarity affects alignment decisions also increases
our confidence that future investigations of institutional similarity gener-
ally, rather than an exclusive focus on joint democracy, will prove fruitful.
The foreign policy choices of states can provide important information about the
preferences of state leaders. Few foreign policy choices are as revealing as the
decision to align with one side over another in an ongoing dispute. Even more than
a formal alliance, actually siding with a disputant reveals a clear preference for one
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state over another. Whereas a formal alliance often promises some form of support
against some unspecified opponent, the decision to assist a disputant in an ongoing
dispute actually delivers aid against a specific opponent. Our goal is to identify those
factors that affect such alignment choices of states. By doing so, we hope not only
to understand better this specific foreign policy choice, but to understand better
those factors that lead decision makers to prefer one state over another.
Our empirical evaluation of the alignment decisions of states that joined ongoing
Militarized Interstate Disputes between 1816 and 1986 reveals that similarities in
the political and economic institutions of states are an important determinant of
alignment behavior and that such similarities were important regardless of the
aligning state’s regime type. The investigation also demonstrates that while the
power of the original disputants and former alliance commitments between the
aligning state and an original disputant generally affected alignment behavior, these
effects held only for aligning autocracies. These results suggest interesting implica-
tions for the democratic peace, the realist and neorealist paradigm, and the growing
literature on selection effects.
The Alignment Choices of States
Alignment choices remain a relatively understudied phenomenon. Several litera-
tures, however, highlight factors that might help to explain these decisions. Since
the decision to join a war is closely related to the decision to align with a particular
disputant, the war diffusion literature should provide a solid foundation for inquiry
into alignment behavior. Explaining why some wars spread has received consider-
able attention (Davis, Duncan, and Siverson, 1978; Most and Starr, 1980; Yamamoto
and Bremer, 1980; Bremer, 1982; Levy, 1982; Siverson and Starr, 1990, 1991). The
war diffusion literature can be viewed as revolving around two principal concepts
identified by Siverson and Starr (1990, 1991): the opportunity to get involved in
and affect dispute outcomes, and the willingness to help or hinder one of the
disputants. Although there are obvious connections between joining and alignment
decisions, factors affecting  a state’s opportunity to join seem less relevant to
alignment behavior as they identify characteristics of the dispute, rather than
characteristics of the disputants, which make intervention worthwhile. Siverson and
Starr (1991), for instance, demonstrate that contiguous third parties are significantly
more likely to join a war than distant states as their proximity affords them the
opportunity to become involved. Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita (1979) similarly
argue that a state is unlikely to join a war unless it has sufficient resources relative
to the primary disputants to affect the outcome. While proximity and capability
clearly affect the likelihood of involvement, it is not clear why either factor should
affect alignment behavior as neither factor indicates any preference over the actual
outcome of the dispute.
In contrast, a factor that affects the willingness of a prospective third party may
be relevant to alignment behavior as it may identify aspects of the disputants that
motivate the joiner.1 Willingness, unlike opportunity, focuses on why a state gets
involved rather than if it can. Alliance commitments between a disputant and a
potential third party are one such factor identified as central to the potential for
war diffusion (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita, 1979; Siverson and King, 1979;
1 Not all factors affecting willingness relate to characteristics of the disputants. Yamamoto and Bremer (1980)
demonstrate that the probability of a major power entering an ongoing war depends on the prior decisions of other
major powers. Major powers are more likely to enter a war if other major powers have already joined, but are less likely
to enter if no other major power has yet joined the war.Although major power involvement seems to affect the willingness
of other major powers, this condition does not bear on characteristics of the disputants and thus does not appear relevant
to alignment choices.
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Siverson and Starr, 1991). Alliance commitments will likely affect alignment behav-
ior as well as the potential for diffusion (joining behavior) because such commit-
ments indicate interest in one of the disputants. There are thus strong reasons to
anticipate that formal alliance commitments affect not only the decision to join, but
also the decision to align with one side. Specifically, we expect that a third party that
joins a dispute will be more likely to help the side to which it has made a previous
commitment via a formal alliance.
While studies of war diffusion focus specifically on a third party’s potential involve-
ment in a dispute, realists and neorealists have focused more generally on the expected
behavior of states in a threatening environment. Since realists and neorealists expect
that states will often form alliances with other states when threatened, this body of
work can inform our expectations of alignment choices. Within the realist tradition,
power considerations are thought to dominate such choices, especially in times of
crises. Realists and neorealists argue that power plays the predominant role in
foreign policy decisions because states fear that the powerful can eliminate the weak
(Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). This fear of conquest undergirds the realist and
neorealist belief about which state characteristic is important—power—and condi-
tions expectations about state behavior—balancing against the strong to prevent
the weak’s elimination.2
While recent revisions of realist logic do not veer from the traditional focus on
power as the motivation for alignments,3 some scholars currently argue that states
may also bandwagon with, as well as balance against, the stronger state. States may
bandwagon to placate the more powerful state (Walt, 1987) or to “obtain values
coveted” (Schweller, 1994). Evaluation of the historical record has yet to resolve the
debate.4 While realism may not provide definitive expectations about whether
joining states will choose the weak or the strong, there is clear agreement that the
distribution of power between the original disputants will play an important role in
such alignment choices.
Although neither the diffusion nor the realist literature suggests that domestic
institutions play an important role in the alignment choices of states, there are
several arguments that suggest the contrary. For instance, the normative explana-
tion for the democratic peace posits that the democratic process fosters norms of
peaceful dispute resolution (Dixon, 1993, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett,
1993). While the law-governed behavior of their domestic setting encourages
democratic leaders to respect international laws, the domestic political experience
of compromise and nonviolent competition encourages democratic leaders to seek
out alternative means of dispute resolution when faced with an international crisis.
This enables democracies to avoid violent conflict with each other.
If democratic dyads experience less conflict than expected as a result of shared
norms of compromise, we might anticipate that they also enjoy more cooperation.
Siverson and Emmons (1991) test this argument by evaluating the tendency for
democracies to form formal alliances with other democracies. They find that
2 Morgenthau (1948:131), justifying the importance of a balance-of-power policy, argues that “[t]he other function
which a successful balance of power fulfills under these conditions is to insure the freedom of one nation from domination
by the other.” Grieco (1988:487) similarly argues that states fear conquest by other states. He writes that “[r]ealism’s
identification of the relative gains problem for cooperation is based on its insight that states in anarchy fear for their
survival as independent actors.” Waltz (1986:102) likewise writes that “[i]n any self-help system, units worry about their
survival, and the worry conditions their behavior.”
3 Walt (1987), however, does argue that the degree of threat posed by another state depends not only on its aggregate
power, but also on its geographic proximity, offensive capability, and its perceived aggressiveness. Geographic proximity
and offensive capability are still indicators of a state’s ability to enforce its will on another, and therefore at least two
thirds of Walt’s threat differs little from the traditional power focus.
4 While Walt (1987) notes that bandwagoning is possible, he argues that balancing predominates. Others suggest
that bandwagoning has been the more common behavior (Kaufman, 1992; Schweller, 1994).
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democracies do tend to form alliances with each other more than would be expected
by chance alone from 1920 to 1965. Although Siverson and Emmons’s study
examines the formation of formal alliances, rather than actual alignment choices,
their study creates expectations that democratic states will be predisposed to side
with fellow democracies in crises. According to this argument, democratic states
would align with fellow democracies because they share the same objectives and
norms.5
While the democratic peace literature can be read to suggest that democratic
states particularly will have a proclivity to align with each other, there are also several
reasons to expect that similar domestic institutions more generally will lead all states
to favor those with more rather than less similar domestic institutions. Hermann
and Kegley (1995), for instance, offer a psychological explanation of the democratic
peace which assumes that perceptions of other states will be colored by the compo-
sition of one’s ingroup and outgroup. Foreign policy decisions are affected by these
perceptions and will, as a result, be biased toward those within the ingroup and
against those without. We might expect, then, that states will tend to align with those
states within their ingroup and against those without. If similarity in political system,
or similarity in domestic institutions generally, distinguish ingroups from out-
groups, then similar states, whether similar democracies or similar autocracies, will
tend to align with each other against those with different domestic institutions.
An interest-based theory concludes similarly (Werner and Lemke, 1996). Domes-
tic institutions are relevant to foreign policy choices because they can affect not only
the process of and constraints on decision making, but also the distribution of
resources in society. Knight (1992) argues, for instance, that while different institu-
tions may accomplish the same ends, like arranging economic exchange, ordering
social relations, or managing political life, the particular form of the institution
determines the distributional consequences. Different institutions can achieve simi-
lar objectives, but the identity of the beneficiaries will differ.
Since leaders often either choose the institutional structure or are chosen by it, a
leader’s interests will be closely tied to the preservation of the institutional structure
of his state.6 States that challenge the maintenance and stability of the institutional
structure of a leader’s state will appear particularly threatening to the leader.7 States
with different institutions should be particularly threatening because they can
increase the costs of enforcing the state’s particular set of institutions. If the costs of
enforcement are lowest when there exists a common consensus of either the
5 One exception arises from the alliance choices of democracies in the years immediately preceding WWII. In these
years, there were fewer alliances between democracies than one would expect by chance alone. This might suggest that
when security issues become paramount, as in an actual dispute or crisis, similar norms and policy orientations might
matter less to the states. If so, we might expect that in this study, which focuses on the alignment behavior of states in
the midst of a dispute, democratic states would be no more likely to join the democratic side than the autocratic side.
Siverson and Emmons (1991) identify another possible explanation, however, which does not suggest that domestic
institutions become less important in times of crisis. That is, the marked decrease in alliances between democracies
might reflect the numerous regime changes which occurred during the inter-war years. In this case, alliances between
democracies declined because an alliance between formally democratic states was not officially revoked when one or
both states underwent an authoritarian regime change. Considering the actual alignment choices of states in the midst
of a dispute, rather than the formation of formal alliances at some pre-dispute time, will help to clarify whether the
cooperative tendencies expected between democracies occur only in the limited instances where security concerns do
not predominate, as realists and neorealists might expect, or if relations between democracies are special regardless of
the security situation.
6 Lake (1996:5–6, italics added) defines security “as the ability to consume, invest, or otherwise use national wealth
as a polity sees fit.” The two essential national freedoms then are “the freedom to possess wealth, traditionally associated
with the territorial integrity of the nation-state, and the freedom to choose its own form of rule, embodied in constitutional
independence and a defining characteristic of sovereignty.” We likewise concur that the ability to determine the institutional
structure of the state is of primary interest to the leader.
7 Werner (1996), for instance, demonstrates that a war participant is much more likely to endure a foreign imposed
regime change if it and its opponent have different domestic institutions.
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inevitability or the legitimacy of a particular set of institutions, then examples of
alternative means of distributing the wealth of society should increase such enforce-
ment costs by altering popular or elite expectations about expected or acceptable
patterns of distribution. As the common consensus breaks down and challenges to
the institutions increase, the costs of preserving a particular institutional arrange-
ment may become prohibitive.8 States with more efficient institutions may also force
leaders who benefit from their less efficient but distributionally advantageous
institutional arrangements to adapt in order to remain competitive in the interna-
tional system. While the adaptation might increase aggregate social returns, it might
do so by reducing the rents realized by the leader (North, 1981; Lake, 1992). Finally,
a leader might recognize that states with different institutional structures may
actively promote the interests of the leader’s internal challengers. In short, if leaders
attempt to maintain their position of power, not for the position itself, but for the
distributional advantages that accrue from the office, then leaders and their cohorts
will find states with differing institutional structures particularly threatening.9
Alignment choices then should reflect the leader’s preference for institutionally
similar states which buttress the leader’s hold on power, over institutionally dissimi-
lar states which may challenge the legitimacy and security of his position of authority.
There are both psychological and interest-based reasons why differences in
domestic institutions should affect the alignment choices of states. Both perspectives
associate differences with threat perception. The empirical evidence will suggest
whether domestic institutions matter to alignment behavior and whether demo-
cratic states alone enjoy a special relationship, as democratic peace theorists might
anticipate, or if states with similar domestic institutions generally tend to support
each other against those with different domestic institutions.
We have identified several factors likely to affect alignment behavior. If states find
others threatening because of their capabilities, as the realists and neorealists argue,
then we will find that alignment choices depend on the power of the original
disputants. Psychological and interest-based explanations suggest, in contrast, that
states will assess the potential threat or appeal of another based not on their power,
but on the similarity of their domestic institutions. If these arguments are true, third
parties will align with the institutionally similar disputant against the more threat-
ening, dissimilar disputant. Alignment behavior need not be motivated by fear,
however. If democracies share similar means of conflict resolution, then we will find
them aligning with other democracies in times of crises. Likewise, past research
leads us to expect that states will align with an allied disputant rather than with a
disputant with which it has made no previous defensive commitment.
Empirical Evaluation
Do domestic institutions affect the alignment choices of states, or do power concerns
alone dominate this decision? Do democratic states alone share a special relation-
ship, or do all states with similar domestic institutions generally ban together?
Finally, do previous promises to aid affect the actual alignment decisions made, or
8 The empirical tendency noted by several international and comparative scholars for domestic changes to diffuse
to neighboring or regional states provides some support for this expectation (Lutz, 1989; Ray, 1989; Kegley and
Raymond, 1990; Huntington, 1991; Starr, 1991).
9 This focus on the specific interests of the leader, rather than those of the state, is not new. Although traditionally
the interests of the state and those of its leader were considered identical, increasingly scholars have noted that leaders
may have interests of their own which may differ from “state interests.” Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller (1992)
and Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson (1995) assume that political survival is the leader’s primary motivation.
Diversionary theorists similarly assume that many foreign policy decisions are motivated by a leader’s desire for increased
popularity or decreased domestic discontent (Levy, 1989; Morgan and Bickers, 1992).
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are crisis decisions unaffected by such prior commitments? We offer preliminary
empirical evidence to address these questions by examining alignment choices in
ongoing Militarized Interstate Disputes. The temporal domain of our investigation
is the period 1816 to 1986. We utilize the revised and updated Correlates of War
Militarized Interstate Dispute Data Set to identify instances where states have
expressed their preference for one state or set of states over another state or set of
states.10 This revised data set identifies not only each participant in the dispute, but
also the day on which they became involved. Consequently, we are able to determine
which states were initial disputants and which states subsequently joined the dispute.
We are interested in those states that participated in a dispute but were not
involved on the first day the dispute began. We look only at those states that actually
participated in the dispute because we believe it reasonable to assume that once a
dispute begins, each state in the system “decides” which side it would align with if
it were to join the dispute and then decides whether to actually enter the dispute
based on its opportunity to act and contribute. The decision to favor one side or
another and the decision to enter then are independent and based largely on
different factors. If the decision to favor one side and to join the dispute are linked,
however, the decision to look only at states that actually participated rather than at
the population of potential participants will introduce some bias into our results.
Given the difficulty of identifying the population of “potential participants,” we
believe such a simplification is reasonable, although our results must be interpreted
with some caution.
A state (j) chooses to align with either Side A or Side B. Side A and Side B include
all those states that were participating on that side as of the date the aligning state,
j, became involved. As a result, if several states entered a dispute at different times,
those that entered later will be aligning not only with the initial disputants, but also
with all those that became involved prior to their participation. This is reasonable
because the character of a side, and a state’s decision to favor one side over another,
might change as other states become involved.
The literatures reviewed create very different expectations about the motivations
behind these alignment decisions. The empirical test should reveal whether states
base their alignment decisions on power concerns, institutional similarities, or prior
commitments. It should also reveal which institutions matter. We operationalize
these variables using standard data sets. To estimate the power of Side A and Side
B, we utilize the Correlates of War composite capability index. We measure the
power of each side as the sum of the power of each state on that side. According to
traditional balancing expectations, a state will be more likely to align with Side A as
Side A’s power decreases and Side B’s power increases.
To evaluate expectations of the impact of domestic institutions, we estimate the
similarity between the political and economic institutions of j and Sides A and B.11
The political institutions of a state can vary on a number of dimensions. One key
dimension, however, is the representativeness of a state’s polity. The institutional
democracy variable within the Polity II data set indicates, according to Gurr,
Jaggers, and Moore (1989:36–9), the competitiveness of political participation, the
openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the constraints on the
chief executive. An 11-point scale is constructed for the level of democracy and
serves as our measure of a state’s political institutions.12
10 The original MID data set is described in Gochman and Maoz (1984).
11 We also examine whether democratic states alone exhibit special behavior by dividing the data set so that we can
examine the alignment decisions of democratic and autocratic aligning states separately.
12 Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore (1990) and Jaggers (1992) provide additional information on these variables.
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The economic institutions of a state can likewise vary on numerous dimensions.
The government’s involvement in the economy, however, does indicate one key
dimension over which such institutions vary. The scope variable within the Polity II
data set indicates “the extent to which all levels of government . . . attempt to
regulate and organize the economic and social lives of the citizens and subjects of
the state” (Gurr, Jaggers, and Moore, 1989:21). The 9-point scope scale serves as
our indicator of a state’s economic institutions.
We construct four variables from this information about state political and
economic institutions. The first and second variables reflect the difference between
the political institutions of j and Side A and of j and Side B, respectively, measured
by the absolute difference in their institutionalized democracy scores. The third and
fourth variables reflect the difference between the economic institutions of j and
Side A and of j and Side B, respectively, measured by the absolute difference in their
scope scores. If Side A or B had more than one member at the time j was choosing
which side to favor, the institutionalized democracy and scope score for the side
were equal to the average institutionalized democracy and scope scores for the states
that comprised the side. If regime type alone affects foreign policy behavior, then
the similarity in economic institutions should not matter. If, in contrast, j evaluates
the threat posed by Sides A and B by the degree to which their institutions are
similar, as is suggested by both the psychological expectations of Hermann and
Kegley (1995) and the interest-based expectations of Werner and Lemke (1996),
then both the political and economic variables will affect alignment behavior. State
j will be more likely to align with Side A as the difference between its political and
economic institutions and those of Side A decrease, and as the difference between
its institutions and those of Side B increase. The test should reveal whether domestic
institutions affect foreign policy decisions and which domestic institutions matter.
To  estimate  the extent to  which j  had an  alliance  commitment with each
disputant, we created two variables, one that identified the proportion of states on
Side A with which j had a defense pact and another that indicated the proportion
of states on Side B with which j had a defense pact. Each variable then varies between
zero and one, indicating whether j has a defense pact with none, some, or all of the
states on a particular side. The Correlates of War Formal Alliance project identifies
the disputants with which j had a defense pact.13 We considered only the existence
of a defense pact, rather than the existence of an entente or a neutrality pact, because
only a defense pact indicates a commitment to aid another in the case of an attack.14
We estimate the following logistic regression model as the decision to join Side
A or not:
State j Aligns with Side A = ß0 + ß1 (Diff. Regime of J&A) + ß2
(Diff. Regime of J&B) + ß3 (Diff. Economies of J&A) + ß4
(Diff. Economies of J&B) + ß5 (Power of A) +
ß6 (Power of B) + ß7 (Defense Pact between J&A) + ß8
(Defense Pact between J&B) +ε
13 See Singer and Small (1966) and Small and Singer (1969) for a description of the project.
14 We also ran the model with the alliance variables operationalized as the proportion of states on Side A with which
j has either a defense pact, an entente (a commitment to consult), or a neutrality pact (a commitment to remain
uninvolved). The results remained virtually unchanged. The only significant change was that when we considered only
those cases where the aligning state was a democracy, the political institutional variables no longer met conventional
standards of statistical significance when the alliance variable was operationalized by this broader criteria. This is not
surprising since, as would be anticipated by the analysis of Siverson and Emmons (1991), there is a significant negative
correlation between differences in the political institutions of j and Sides A and B and the existence of a broad alliance
commitment.
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The dependent variable is equal to one if the state aligns with Side A and zero if
it aligns with Side B. If institutional similarities affect alignment behavior as
anticipated by Hermann and Kegley (1995) and Werner and Lemke (1996), then
ß1 and ß3 will be negative, implying that as the difference between the institutions
of j and Side A increases, j is less likely to align with Side A. In this case, we would
also expect that ß2 and ß4 will be positive, suggesting that as the difference between
j’s institutions and those of Side B increases, j will be more likely to align with Side
A over Side B. We anticipate that most realists and neorealists would expect ß5 to
be negative and ß6 to be positive, implying that j will be more likely to align with a
side as that side gets weaker. Finally, we would expect according to the war diffusion
literature, that former promises will be honored implying that ß7 will be positive
while ß8 is negative.
Table 1 reports the results of the logistic regression model and the classification
table produced. These results are very encouraging and increase our confidence
that we have identified factors relevant to the alignment decision. Conventional
realist expectations that the importance of domestic institutions will decline dra-
matically in crises do not appear to be warranted. The institutional variables all have
the expected sign and easily meet traditional standards of significance. The evi-
dence indicates that an aligning state is more likely to align with Side A as its political
and economic institutions become more similar to Side A and less so with Side B,
but more likely to align with Side B as its institutions become less similar to Side A
and more similar to Side B. In contrast, while significant, the relationships for the
power variables are not in the direction that we believe most realists and neorealists
would expect. While there is a relationship between each side’s power and j’s
decision, the evidence indicates that j is more likely to align with Side A as A’s power
increases, but less likely to align with Side A as B’s power increases. Rather than
balancing against the stronger side, the evidence suggests that states tend to align
with them and thus supports the expectations of the revisionist realists (Kaufman,
1992; Schweller, 1994). Finally, as would be anticipated by the war diffusion
literature, a prior promise to aid increases the likelihood that j will align with that
side when called upon. Alliances therefore indicate not only which states are more
likely to join an ongoing dispute (Siverson and Starr, 1991), but also which side will
receive the benefit of their aid.
The classification table provides additional information. The model’s overall
predictive ability is 74.55 percent correct, which exceeds the 50.13 percent correct
predictive ability of the modal category (align with Side A). The model provides a
proportional reduction in error of 49 percent from the naive model which assumes
that the modal category always occurs. The pseudo R2 of .52, calculated according
to Aldrich and Nelson’s (1984) technique and with Hagle and Mitchell’s (1992)
multiplier, indicates that the model provides a reasonable fit for the data.
As an additional indication of the fit of the model, we constructed a calibration
table. A calibration table compares the predicted probabilities of an event with the
proportion of cases for which the event actually occurred. If the model were perfect,
we would expect that the predicted probability of an event and the proportion of
cases for which the event occurred would be equal, creating an upward-sloping
45-degree line and a calibration index score of 0.15 A downward-sloping diagonal
line and a calibration index score of 1, on the other hand, would indicate the worst
possible level of calibration. The calibration table we constructed suggests that the
15 The calibration index score, CI, is calculated in the following manner where N represents the total number of
observations, Nj indicates the number of cases in a predicted category, and dj represents the proportion of times the
target event actually occurred when a particular proportion was predicted, fj: CI = Σ (CIj/N), CIj = Nj(fj - dj). See Yates
(1990) for additional information.
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fit of the model is very good. The predicted probability is a good indication of the
proportion of cases for which j actually aligned with Side A as is indicated by the
low calibration index of .0195.
More important, perhaps, is the marginal impact each variable has on j’s decision
to align with either side. The marginal impact of each of the variables is presented
in the final column of Table 1.16 This column reports the marginal impact of the
unit change in each independent variable specified in column 4 of Table 1, holding
the other variables constant at their means if they are continuous variables and
modes if they are dichotomous variables. We note first that each of the eight variables
has a sizable impact on the probability that j will align with Side A as the value of
each variable increases from its observed minimum to its observed maximum. Each
variable then is not only statistically significant but substantively significant as well.
Note, however, that the cumulative marginal effects of the variables differ. The
cumulative marginal impact of the differences in economic institutions seems to
have a greater effect than differences in political institutions on the probability that
j will align with Side A. While the marginal effect of differences in j’s and Side A’s
(B’s) economic institutions is 53 (49) percent, the marginal effect of differences in
j’s and Side A’s (B’s) political institutions is smaller at 37 (39) percent. While the
TABLE 1. The Effects of Political and Economic Institutional Differences, Power Relations,
and Formal Alliance Ties on a Joiner’s Decision to Align with Side A
Change in
Probability
Standard Range of of j Aligning
Variable Coefficient Error Variable with Side A
Constant –0.4174 0.2978
Diff. economies of j & A –0.3490 0.0748*** 0–8 –.5322
Diff. economies of j & B 0.2845 0.0776*** 0–8 .4997
Diff. regime of j & A –0.1630 0.0434*** 0–10 –.3740
Diff. regime of j & B 0.1690 0.0442*** 0–10 .3987
Power of A 6.2624 1.2545*** .0001–.8216 .6903
Power of B –3.2863 1.0978** .00001–.6653 –.4222
Defense pact between j & A 2.0764 0.4627*** 0–1 .4140
Defense pact between j & B –1.4041 0.5438** 0–1 –.2852
*** = p ≤ 0.001; ** = p ≤ 0.01; * = p ≤ 0.05
Calibration index = 0.0195
Predicted Behavior of Joining State
Actual Behavior of
Joining State Join State B Join State A
Join State B 152 40
Join State A 58 135
Percentage of correct predictions = 74.55; null model = 50.13; N = 385
Model chi-square = 165.294, d.f. = 8, significance < 0.0001, pseudo R2 = .52
Significance levels based on X2 calculations
16 These impacts are calculated based on the coefficients reported in column 2 of Table 1. For detailed discussions
of the rationale and procedure see King (1989) and Demaris (1992).
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difference is not large, it is particularly interesting given the considerable attention
placed on  the importance of  regime type  by many scholars. Regime type  is
important—although perhaps in ways not considered by democratic peace theo-
rists—but differences in economic institutions also appear to play a large role in
foreign policy decisions. Also note that although the sign of the power variables may
be surprising, the cumulative marginal effect on the probability that j will align with
Side A as Side A’s power increases from .0001 to .82 and Side B’s power increases
from .00001 to .66, is impressively high, 69 percent and 42 percent, respectively.
Perhaps not as surprising, former alliance commitments also increase the likelihood
that the aligning state will align with that side. As the proportion of states on Side
A (B) with which j has an alliance increases from 0 to 1, the probability that j will
align with Side A increases (decreases) by 41 (28) percent. Perhaps more surprising
is that the marginal effect of formal alliance ties is generally smaller than the
marginal effects of the other variables.
Regime Differences
Given recent evidence that democratic states have a special relationship with other
democratic states (Doyle, 1983, 1986; Siverson and Emmons, 1991; Dixon, 1993,
1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993), it is reasonable to wonder whether
the results presented in Table 1 are driven solely by the proclivity of democratic
states to favor other democracies. The failure to differentiate whether the aligning
state is a democracy may mask the possibility that only democratic states behave in
this manner and that autocracies do not base their foreign policy decisions on the
similarity of state institutions. This concern is alleviated somewhat by the signifi-
cance of the differences in economic institutions, as democratic peace theorists do
not posit that states with similar economic institutions should have a natural affinity
for each other. However, confidence in the general effect of institutional similarities,
rather than solely democratic bonds, would be increased if alignment decisions were
based on the similarity of political and economic institutions regardless of the
regime type of the state that must choose.
We can provide such confidence by splitting the data set in two, one part including
only democratic aligning states and another including only autocratic aligning
states. Aligning states with an institutionalized democracy score of six or above are
included in the “democracy” data set while states with an institutionalized democ-
racy score below six are included in the “autocracy” data set. If political similarity
is only important to democratic states, then differences in the political institutions
of j and Sides A and B will not be relevant to an autocracy’s alignment behavior.
Table 2 reports  the  results of the  logistic regression model for  the set of
democratic aligning states. The number of cases has been reduced from 385 to 137.
First, the classification table indicates that the model performs very well, correctly
predicting 86.13 percent of the cases. This is actually an improvement over the
percent predicted correctly when the full data set was analyzed. Second, despite the
impressive strength of the model, only the institutional variables retain their
expected signs and their significance at traditional levels. Both the power and
alliance variables become statistically insignificant and the power variables reverse
their signs as well. Several explanations for these changes might be offered. It is
possible that the alignment decisions of democracies are only affected by institu-
tional similarities and not by power or by former commitments. This would be very
surprising, however, especially with respect to prior alliance commitments. Perhaps
more likely, these results might indicate a selection effect similar to that noted by
Fearon (1994b). If the allies of democratic states are less likely to be attacked to
begin with, presumably because the alliance commitments of democracies are so
credible, then the population of alignment opportunities for democratic states has
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been biased toward those defense pacts that were initially considered incredible for
one reason or another.17 If so, it is not surprising that formal alliance commitments
do not anticipate well the alignment choices of democratic states.
Although we are quite willing to be instructed on this point, we do not foresee
how a similar selection effect could operate with respect to the power variables. As
a result, although we hesitate to draw conclusions regarding the alliance variables,
the data seem to suggest that the alignment decisions of democratic states do not
depend on the power of the disputants. Instead, democratic states choose to align
with the side that shares similar political and economic institutions. As would be
expected from the normative argument of the democratic peace, democracies do
seem to share a special relationship with other democracies. Note, however, that
democratic peace theory does not explain why economic similarity would matter,
as it apparently does.
The last column of Table 2 reports the marginal impact of each of the variables.
We only discuss the substantive significance of the institutional variables as they are
the only factors that systematically affect a democracy’s alignment behavior. The
marginal impact of these variables remains formidable, and in fact, increases from
those reported in Table 3. The probability that a democratic state will align with
TABLE 2. The Effects of Political and Economic Institutional Differences, Power Relations,
and Formal Alliance Ties on Democratic Joiners’ Decisions to Align with Side A
Change in
Standard Range of Probability
Variable Coefficient Error Variable of j Aligning
with Side A
Constant –0.3717 0.7614
Diff. economies of j & A –0.4938 0.2168* 0–8 –.5992
Diff. economies of j & B 0.4385 0.2015* 0–8 .6851
Diff. regime of j & A –0.3877 0.1031*** 0–10 –.7418
Diff. regime of j & B 0.3645 0.1108*** 0–10 .6869
Power of A –0.9067 2.2500 .0006–.7660 –.1552
Power of B 1.4233 2.7112 .00001–.4726 .1648
Defense pact between j & A 47.3671 211.0514 0–1 .6002
Defense pact between j & B –43.4231 211.0423 0–1 –.3998
*** = p ≤ 0.001; ** = p ≤ 0.01; * = p ≤ 0.05
Predicted Behavior of Joining State
Actual Behavior of
Joining State Join State B Join State A
Join State B 62 9
Join State A 10 56
Percentage of correct predictions = 86.13; null model = 51.83; N = 137
Model chi-square = 102.932, d.f. = 8, significance < 0.0001, pseudo R2 = .74
Significance levels based on X2 calculations
17 Gartner and Siverson (1996) argue that multilateral wars are uncommon because state leaders intentionally select
targets that are unlikely to inspire intervention by a third party. A defense pact with a democratic state might be a clear
indication to potential aggressors that an attack on such a target will not prove fruitful.
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Side A decreases by 59 and 74 percent as its economic and political institutions
range from being very similar to being very dissimilar to those of Side A. Likewise,
the probability that a democratic state will align with Side A increases by 68 percent
as both its economic and political institutions range from being very similar to being
very dissimilar to those of Side B.
The real test, however, is whether the institutional variables remain important
when only the autocratic aligning states are considered. Table 3 reports the same
logistic regression model including only autocratic aligning states. Despite the
exclusion of the democratic aligning states, the institutional variables, as well as the
power and alliance variables, retain the expected sign and are statistically signifi-
cant. Autocratic aligning states, like democratic aligning states, also consider the
similarities and differences in the political and economic institutions of each side in
their alignment decisions. This evidence suggests, at a minimum, that democratic
states alone do not share a special relationship. It also provides support for both
the psychological and interest-based explanations which argue that differences in
institutions motivate foreign policy behavior as they indicate which states in the
system are threatening. Although the fit of the model is not quite as impressive as
that reported for democratic aligning states (the percent predicted correctly de-
creases to 74.19 percent), it is still quite good. The final column of Table 3 also
indicates that the institutional variables remain substantively significant. Although
their marginal effect is less than that for democratic aligning states, the likelihood
that an autocratic state will align with Side A is changed significantly as the states’
institutions become more and less similar to those of Sides A and B.
TABLE 3. The Effects of Political and Economic Institutional Differences, Power Relations,
and Formal Alliance Ties on Authoritarian Joiners’ Decisions to Align with Side A
Change in
Standard Range of Probability
Variable Coefficient Error Variable of j Aligning
with Side A
Constant –0.4862 0.3456
Diff. economies of j & A –0.3084 0.0868*** 0–8 –.4928
Diff. economies of j & B 0.2282 0.0906** 0–8 .4191
Diff. regime of j & A –0.1302 0.0628* 0–10 –.2998
Diff. regime of j & B 0.1913 0.0750** 0–10 .4357
Power of A 8.1567 1.7849*** .0001–.8216 .7244
Power of B –4.3353 1.3733** .00001–.6653 –.4982
Defense pact between j & A 1.6546 0.4978*** 0–1 .3574
Defense pact between j & B –1.1828 0.5648* 0–1 –.2524
*** = p ≤ 0.001; ** = p ≤ 0.01; * = p ≤ 0.05
Predicted Behavior of Joining State
Actual Behavior of
Joining State Join State B Join State A
Join State B 93 28
Join State A 36 91
Percentage of correct predictions = 74.19; null model = 51.21; N = 248
Model chi-square = 91.998, d.f. = 8, significance < 0.0001, pseudo R2 = .47
Significance levels based on X2 calculations
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While the institutional variables retain their statistical and substantive importance
in both parts of our data set, it is interesting that the relevance of the power variables
differs dramatically depending upon whether the aligning state is democratic or
autocratic. As noted above, the power of Sides A and B have little effect on a
democratic state’s decision to align with either side. In contrast, the power of Sides
A and B matter quite a bit to an autocracy. The probability that an autocracy will
align with Side A increases by 72 percent and decreases by 49 percent as the power
of Side A and Side B, respectively, increase from their observed minimums to their
observed maximums. Although institutions matter to autocracies, so too does power.
While none of the literature reviewed provides any insight into this difference, it
seems an extremely interesting puzzle for further research.
Note also that the data clearly suggest that formal alliance commitments do affect
the alignment decisions of autocracies. This obvious change from the results
reported for democratic aligning states suggests either that the alliance commit-
ments made by autocracies do not produce the same selection effects noted for
defense pacts involving democratic aligning states, or simply that autocracies are
more likely to honor their formal commitments than are democracies. Either way,
the difference between the data sets is extremely interesting. In the first case, if the
degree to which a selection effect operates varies for democracies and autocracies,
then states that attack the allies of democratic and autocratic states must view the
threat posed by these alliance commitments differently. This is especially puzzling
because it appears that autocratic aligning states do base their alignment choices
on their prior commitments. In the second case, if autocracies are more likely to
honor their commitments than are democracies, then we might rethink the increas-
ingly popular assumption that democracies endure greater audience, or back-down,
costs than do autocracies (Fearon, 1994a).
Temporal Differences
As a final evaluation of the relevance and strength of these alternate explanations
for alignment behavior, we consider the impact of a temporal control. While there
is little reason to expect that the impact of power and formal commitments will
change over time, it is likely that the effect of domestic institutions might vary. In
particular, the psychological and interest-based explanations suggest only that
institutional differences are important because they affect a leader’s perception of
the threat posed by others in the international system. Neither argument, however,
suggests which domestic institutions will be particularly relevant. The indicators of
institutional differences chosen for this study are clearly indicative of those features
considered particularly salient in the present. However, there is no reason to expect
that regime type and government economic involvement are necessarily the most
salient institutional differences across all periods of time. The key determinants of
ingroups and outgroups and resource distribution might very well depend on other
types of institutions. Since neither approach offers a theory about which institutional
differences will pose a threat to the leader and thus become salient to foreign policy
decision making, it is reasonable to expect that the relevance of the institutional
variables might vary across time.18
As a preliminary check to determine whether the relevance of the institutional
variables to alignment behavior varies across time, we separate the data into two
time periods—the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Other scholars have found
18 Such a theory might focus particularly on those institutions that vary the most across states in the international
system. In addition, the interest-based argument would also consider which institutions have the greatest distributional
consequences within a society.
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inter-century differences in their results, making this dividing point particularly
telling (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972). As Table 4 reveals, there are sharp
variations in the significance of these particular institutional variables across time.
In the twentieth century, differences in the political and economic institutions of
the states were very important to alignment behavior. In the nineteenth century, in
contrast, differences in these institutions appear irrelevant. Surprisingly, the power
and alliance  variables  do not  perform well  in the  nineteenth century either.
Although this might not be surprising given that there were only 76 instances of
alignment in the nineteenth century, compared to 309 cases in the twentieth
century, the insignificance of almost all of the variables suggests that there are
important differences between the centuries which we have yet to identify.
TABLE 4. The Effects of Political and Economic Institutional Differences, Power Relations,
and Formal Alliance Ties on a Joiner’s Decision to Align with Side (19th and 20th Centuries)
Twentieth Century Nineteenth Century
Standard Standard
Variable Coefficient Error Coefficient Error
Constant –0.4305 0.4306 –1.1278 0.5804
Diff. economies of j & A –0.3598 0.0838*** –0.4083 0.9446
Diff. economies of j & B 0.3265 0.0883*** 0.2683 0.5144
Diff. regime of j & A –0.1980 0.0487*** 0.1434 0.1751
Diff. regime of j & B 0.2061 0.0512*** –0.1666 0.1440
Power of A 5.4098 1.3343*** 16.5472 5.5409**
Power of B –3.2155 1.2670** –2.2519 2.6610
Defense pact between j & A 2.6034 0.6430*** 1.0166 0.9267
Defense pact between j & B –2.2904 0.7505** –0.2021 0.9756
*** = p ≤ 0.001; ** = p ≤ 0.01; * = p ≤ 0.05
Twentieth Century
Predicted Behavior of Joining State
Actual Behavior of
Joining State Join State B Join State A
Join State B 132 25
Join State A 41 111
Percentage of correct predictions = 78.64; null model = 50.81; N = 309
Model chi-square = 160.806, d.f. = 8, significance < 0.0001, pseudo R2 = .59
Significance levels based on X2 calculations
Nineteenth Century
Predicted Behavior of Joining State
Actual Behavior of
Joining State Join State B Join State A
Join State B 27 8
Join State A 10 31
Percentage of correct predictions = 76.32; null model = 53.95; N = 76
Model chi-square = 27.681, d.f. = 8, significance < 0.0005, pseudo R2 = .46
Significance levels based on X2 calculations
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One possibility suggests itself at least with respect to the institutional variables.
We might, of course, conclude that the significance of domestic institutions to the
alignment choices of states is merely a twentieth-century phenomenon, perhaps a
product of the Cold War and the sharp ideological divide in World War II. Although
these particular domestic institutions appear irrelevant to alignment choices in the
nineteenth century, it is perhaps overly hasty to discount the relevance of differences
in all domestic institutions. This is especially true if we return to the original idea
posited by Hermann and Kegley (1995) and Werner and Lemke (1996) that it must
be differences in institutional structures that affect perceptions of threat. Closer
inspection of the data reveals that there was little variation in the political and
economic domestic structures of the states included in this data set for the nine-
teenth century.19 Differences in these particular domestic institutions then did not
matter to nineteenth-century alignment choices, because there were few differences
during that time. In order to explain alignment choices through time, it will be
necessary to develop more advanced expectations of which domestic institutions will
be particularly salient. The most obvious place to begin is to identify the types of
institutions over which states differed at any particular period of time.
Implications and Conclusions
The empirical evidence advanced in this article suggests that a relationship exists
between alignment behavior in international disputes and differences in political
and economic institutions. This relationship has been absent from previous studies
on conflict expansion. Importantly, this relationship persists regardless of whether
the aligning state is democratic or autocratic. The empirical evidence also suggests
that the power of each disputing side is important to some aligning states, but not
to others. In particular, autocratic aligning states are far more likely to align with a
side as its power grows, whereas democratic aligning states are not systematically
influenced by power considerations. Finally, the data provide confounding infor-
mation regarding the effect of alliance commitments on alignment behavior.
Whereas the alignment choices of democracies are not affected by alliance commit-
ments, such promises do affect autocratic alignment behavior. The potential for
selection effects was noted.
These empirical findings are important because they suggest new avenues of
exploration for those interested in the potentially related question of the democratic
peace. With a few exceptions (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Weart, 1994; Leeds and
Davis, 1995), most scholars have found that only democratic states share a special
relationship, leading them to focus on characteristics unique to democracies like
democratic norms or institutional constraints. However, if autocracies also favor
19 In the twentieth century, differences on the scope variable ranged from zero, suggesting very similar economic
structures, to eight, suggesting large differences in economic institutions. In contrast, in the nineteenth century for the
states included in this data set, the largest difference between the scope scores was two, suggesting that during this time
government involvement in the economy was minimal for most states. The mean of the variable measuring differences
in the economy of j and Side A (j and Side B) was 2.37 (3.90) with a standard deviation of 1.97 (1.81) in the twentieth
century, compared to a mean of .18 (.41) and standard deviation of .38 (.70) in the nineteenth century. As one would
expect, there is also substantial differences in the variation of the institutionalized democracy variable across the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In the nineteenth century, in over 60 percent of the cases, the difference between
the institutionalized democracy score of the aligning state and one of the original disputants was less than two. In
contrast, in the twentieth century, less than 40 percent of the cases had such a small difference in their scores.
Additionally, in the nineteenth century less than 2 percent of the cases were ones in which the aligning state and the
original disputants’ institutionalized democracy scores differed by eight or more. In the twentieth century, approxi-
mately 20 percent of the cases involved such large differences. The mean of the variable measuring differences in the
polity of j and Side A (j and Side B) was 3.97 (3.90) with a standard deviation of 3.57 (3.33) in the twentieth century,
compared to a mean of 2.45 (2.31) and standard deviation of 2.25 (2.49) in the nineteenth century.
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each other, then the exclusive focus on democratic institutions and norms may be
overly narrow. Likewise, the importance of economic similarity also suggests that
an exclusive focus on regime type is unwarranted. While democracies may be
unique, as is possibly indicated by their failure to base alignment choices on power
considerations, other domestic attributes also matter to foreign policy decision
making.
Given the consistent empirical evidence that differences in domestic institutions
affect alignment behavior, additional theoretical development seems necessary.
Potentially fruitful avenues are suggested by both the psychological argument of
Hermann and Kegley (1995) and the interest-based argument of Werner and Lemke
(1996). Both approaches posit that differences in domestic institutions are impor-
tant because they indicate the degree to which other states pose a threat to the state
or its leader. These arguments differ significantly from both realist and neorealist
expectations that domestic attributes are irrelevant to power politics and traditional
liberal expectations which focus on variation in either the institutional constraints
or the norms created by different types of regimes. If differences in domestic
institutions affect perceptions of threat, then domestic institutions are central to
security issues.
These empirical findings are also important  because they suggest that the
conventional realist and neorealist expectations of alignment behavior should be
reconsidered. The basic assumptions of realism imply that states with greater power
should pose a threat to weaker states. Concerned with their security, weaker states
should balance against this threat to prevent their elimination. The data indicate,
however, that states do not tend to align themselves with the weaker state but rather
tend to bandwagon with the stronger side. While this bandwagoning effect accords
with some revisionist realist expectations (Kaufman, 1992; Schweller, 1994), the
predominance of bandwagoning definitely raises doubts about the fundamental
expectations of realist thought. If states rarely balance, perhaps it is the case that
they do not necessarily find power threatening. Furthermore, the conventional
wisdom is squarely challenged by the fact that democratic states do not appear to
weigh power considerations in their alignment choices at all—they neither balance
nor bandwagon. Power concerns then are not universal. Rather, the degree to which
power plays into foreign policy decision making depends on the internal attributes
of the states considered.
Finally, the mixed effect of prior alliance commitments on alignment behavior
raises several interesting puzzles. Initially, the expectation that previous commit-
ments to offer aid in the event of an attack should provide the clearest indicator of
a state’s alignment behavior appears extremely sound, if not obvious. It was quite
surprising then for the data to suggest that only autocracies base their alignment
behavior on prior alliance commitments. We suggested that the null results for
democratic states might actually suggest that such prior commitments are so
credible that a selection effect is created. While this seems plausible, the puzzle still
remains because  the  significant  relationship  between prior commitments and
alignment behavior for autocracies suggests that such a selection effect is not
operating for these defense pacts, even though autocracies do appear to base their
alignment behavior on their alliance commitments. Exploration of this variation is
an interesting area for future research.
There  are important limitations which  must  be noted  and extensions and
modifications which must still be made. We have already noted that these results
must be interpreted with caution as a result of possible selection effects. The
inter-temporal differences also create some doubt as to the generalizability of these
findings. Clearly, in order to determine whether institutional differences affect
alignment behavior generally, additional work is necessary to explain which insti-
tutional differences may be particularly relevant at any time to a leader or a state.
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While there are obvious areas for development and improvement, the empirical
evidence presented here suggests an interesting picture of international interactions
and the relevance particularly of national-level factors to those interactions. Empiri-
cal analysis increases our confidence that differences in domestic institutions and,
under some conditions, power and alliance commitments, have a significant impact
on foreign policy decisions.
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